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Philosophy’s Folds: Seneca, Cavarero, and the History of Rectitude 
Victoria Rimell 
 
I. 
Adriana Cavarero’s characteristically wry critical account of rectitude in the Western 
philosophical tradition (Inclinazioni: critica della rettitudine, 2013), which is soon to 
appear in an English translation, <1> investigates how Western philosophy develops 
its distinctive orthopedia; that is, how canonical thinkers in the tradition come to 
celebrate theoria as a perfect, static verticality that makes ideas of rectitude, rightness, 
straightness and uprightness coincide. Rectitude, she observes, repeatedly contests, 
combats and opposes itself to the ‘slippery slope’ of inclination - the constantly 
shifting posture in which the subject evolves in time and in changing relations of care 
and desire towards others. Cavarero’s recasting of a familiar tradition in terms of its 
geometries and postures is itself structured as a labyrinth of twists, turns, leaps and 
loops. Disrespectful of philosophic ‘exclusivity’, and insistent on the philosophical 
rigor of ‘literary’ analysis, she juxtaposes, entwines and contrasts landmark 
philosophical thinkers  - Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Proudhon, Arendt, Levinas -  
with and alongside a dizzying array of novelists, anthropologists and visual artists 
(from Canetti to Woolf, Tolstoy to Proust, Barnett Newman to Da Vinci). In this way, 
she traces the multiple routes through which European thought inherits a naturalized, 
gendered lexicon of legal, ethical and sexual ‘rightness’, ‘righteousness’, or 
‘correctness’, concepts hostile to all beings that lean, are bent, queer, wrong, morally 
crooked, deviant or ambiguous. Uprightness or lack of inclination - towards the other, 
towards desire - is what separates the self-sufficient, non-dependent homo rectus from 
the vulnerable child, from women (and in particular the supine, penetrated woman, 
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and the constantly arched-over, attentive mother) and from sexually passive or 
effeminate men, work-hunched slaves, and animals. Inclination itself, the ‘bending’ 
and accommodation to the needs of others that encompasses or is set up to define 
(physical and emotional) female labor, maternal care and ‘passive’ sexuality, is 
persistently envisioned as threatening to the equilibrium of identity: such schemata 
have carried and continue to carry great symbolic weight in the framing of women as 
morally or mentally unbalanced and as crooked or prone to deception before 
patriarchal law. <2> Inclination thus comes to figure not just attentiveness, care, duty 
and desire, but also a lack of moral virtue inseparable from an ‘undignified’ 
vulnerability and penetrability. 
The paradigm, Cavarero argues, can be seen to develop from Plato (sewn into 
her tapestry after Kant, Newman and Woolf), and from the programmatic moment the 
proto-philosopher in book 7 of the Republic unbends himself from the crouched 
position in the cave and stands up as he emerges into the light of knowledge and truth: 
there remains, she notes, an unresolved, tragic strain in Plato between the pure and 
sublime form of philosophizing that Plato identifies with static verticality, and the 
diagonal, Socratic path back down to the cave that figures philosophy as a political 
praxis and way of living, and that ends in failure and forced suicide.  For Cavarero, 
the extent to which Western philosophical truth has been predicated on a verticalized 
geometry (and thus on a flattening or forgetting of the enigmatic tensions that animate 
Platonic thought) remains unmapped, and its gendered nature - the subjects, kinds of 
thinking and behavior it excludes or marks as improper – remains at least partially 
concealed. In ‘uncovering’ the development of rectitude from its roots in antiquity – 
not just in (the reception of) Plato’s and Aristotle’s orthos logos, but also, she argues 
briefly, in Stoic ideals of ratio recta, particularly as they are interpreted in Christian 
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thought from Augustine onwards – Cavarero alludes often to metaphors of seeing. In 
re- or mis-appropriating a forensic, Platonic gaze (with an eye on Heidegger’s parsing 
of Platonic a-letheia as orthotes or ‘correctness of sight’ rather than ‘revelation’, 74), 
her task is to highlight that which has been concealed, or even that which is in clear 
sight but nonetheless remains unseen. This strategy of ‘highlighting’, at the risk of 
seeming to ‘exaggerate’, pays overt homage to Hannah Arendt’s rhetorical strategies 
(20-1). We are encouraged to ‘look with curiosity’ at the theme of inclination, as a 
new ‘transparency’ is laid over snapshots of what is later termed a ‘Western 
macrotext’ (61) that posits rectitude over and against ‘maternal’ leaning (25-6). As 
Cavarero recognizes, the underlying model of this proper philosophical and political 
subject – the autocratic, integral, self-referential, non dependent (and implicitly) 
Western, able-bodied male – has been under attack for at least a century: she 
explicitly positions herself within a feminist-deconstructive tradition when she offers 
not just an astute critique of the censoring and othering of inclination as ‘womanly’ 
care or as female ‘instability’ in Western thought, but also a corrective to the 
postmodern tendency to remake this subject by re-spinning her-him-it into an endless, 
performative play of differences and poses, which often does little to address the 
ontological structures of masculinity as they are implicated in the devaluing and 
limitation of female subjectivity (21). She draws inspiration from Arendt’s remarks in 
‘Some questions of moral philosophy’, where Arendt recognizes that ‘every 
inclination turns outward; it leans out of the self in the direction of whatever may 
affect me from the outside world. It is precisely through inclination…that I establish 
contact with the world’. <3> This statement returns as a riff throughout Inclinazioni, 
leading up to a generous critique of Arendt’s disinterest in the mother and infancy in 
her ‘abstract’ representation of natality, a central concept in Arendt’s political thought 
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whose potential, for Cavarero, is both imprecisely defined, and unrealized (149-167).  
Cavarero’s project embraces and seeks to develop key contributions to 
feminist care ethics, from Eva Feder Kittay’s Love’s Labor, to the work of Carol 
Gilligan, Virginia Held and Sara Ruddick on maternal care, alongside Judith Butler’s, 
Jacques Derrida’s and Roberto Esposito’s meditations on immunity and precarity.<4> 
Invulnerability, or what is now the liberal individualist model of the independent self, 
is a ‘mirage’, as Cavarero puts it, an ‘invention’ (181) which ensures both that care is 
undervalued and necessarily concealed (outsourced to people of lower social status 
and especially women), and also that those dignified subjects who cannot be seen to 
need or desire must choose between compromising that dignity and appropriating 
what they need as already theirs by right, either by obscuration or by violence. 
Thinking personhood otherwise is not a matter – as Alasdair MacIntyre would posit - 
of simply reconciling vulnerability and relationality with the virtue of rational 
independent agents, or of treating maternity and the relation between mother and baby 
as the exclusive locus of asymmetrical relationality that structures all other relations 
(a potential misconception of Ruddick’s work).<5> It is to recognize relationality as 
constitutive of identity, and to honor inclination – or a ‘continuous inter-webbing of 
singular and plural dependencies’ (24) - as the prevalent posture of an ethical life 
lived in time. 
 
II 
My intention in this paper is to explore one direction in which Cavarero’s infectious 
curiosity might lead us, and thus to showcase how her latest project might stimulate 
productive dialogue between feminist critics in different areas of the humanities that 
are not currently in close contact with one another.  The suggestive blend of 
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provocatively broad strokes and intricate close readings in Inclinazioni creates 
multiple flashpoints in her text that might open up (onto) exciting future debates and 
critical encounters. I want to home in on just one of those points of aperture which as 
a classicist strikes me as especially significant, but which might come to stand for 
Cavarero’s articulated and thematized point that (re-reading) the history of ideas 
matters, and matters especially for feminist philosophy as a political project engaged 
in stirring awareness of what has been sifted out or silenced over time, and why, and 
with what consequences for female subjectivity and flourishing. I refer to her 
momentary acknowledgement (105) of Seneca the Younger’s crucial role in the 
evolution of the principles or ontology of rectitude, alongside her mention of another 
Roman philosopher whom she identifies as marking an ‘unusual turn’ (134) in the 
history of philosophy: Lucretius. Yet the cultural specificity of this connection - 
posited implicitly in Inclinazioni only as a contrast, across separate chapters -  is 
rendered improbable by a broader construction of Roman philosophy as a deviant 
supplement to its canonical Greek counterpart (to the extent that that Hellenistic 
philosophy is often barely studied at all in modern philosophy departments, and 
Seneca in particular has long been disqualified as a ‘proper’ philosopher, or ignored). 
Lucretius’ image of clinamen, the ‘swerve’ of atoms that results in the collisions 
necessary for the creation of life, lingers as an implicit metaphor for Cavarero’s own 
maze of generative incontri, yet despite the rebellious intuitions that lead her to 
Lucretius, and briefly to Seneca, the ‘otherness’ of Roman philosophy remains 
unacknowledged and unexamined in her text. Here I am less concerned with accusing 
Cavarero of a scholarly omission (her account is necessarily and polemically 
tendentious) than with exploiting her own deviation into ancient Roman thought and 
her disregard for a disciplining canon (literally ‘straight rod’ or ‘rule’) so as to begin 
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to spy an important blindspot in the tradition. Looking here, at Seneca, and hearing 
the echoes of Senecan literariness and satire in Cavarero (and vice versa), helps us 
envision how the tensions Cavarero notes in Plato are sustained and energized with 
differing, unpredictable outcomes elsewhere, and therefore how the story of rectitude 
is always already a narrative not just of domination but of struggle and its necessary 
concealment. As Cavarero knows, it is only in fully understanding the paralyzing 
force of this concealment that we can summon the brazenness to make it move, or 
bend. 
In what follows, I will examine ways in which the gendered ontology of 
rectitude is disturbed and transformed in Seneca’s end of life magnum opus, the 
Moral Epistles to Lucilius, and so try to draw out the question of how exactly to 
reconcile Seneca as a thinker of precarity, and of philosophy as an imperfect, 
quotidian praxis, with the writer who posits a spatializing metaphysic of static 
impermeability as the regulative ideal and telos of Stoic philosophy. I argue that the 
Epistles become an intense laboratory for developing ways of moving towards an 
ontology of inclination that attends to an urgent need to confront and transform the 
consequences of political impotence and threats to bodily integrity for Roman 
aristocratic manhood in the 60sCE (the Epistles were written in the years leading up 
to Seneca’s forced suicide in April of 65 following the so-called Pisonian conspiracy 
against Nero, when many other leading men were put to death). As such, I argue that 
the Epistles are an important and significantly underexplored text for feminist thinkers 
across the humanities who are interested in the ethical and political implications of 
acknowledging a ‘primary vulnerability to others’ (Butler 2004, xiv). The Epistles 
serve to remind us that such investigations have a (tortuous) history whose 
suppression or misreading has been and continues to be politically significant.  
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My starting point is the critical status quo that, as Roman historian Paul Veyne 
puts it, ‘Rectitude is a general principle’ in Seneca.<6> Indeed there is no shortage 
of evidence for this apparently incontestable observation. Senecan Stoicism promotes 
itself so insistently in terms of rectitude, while the discourse of rectitude (inseparable 
from that of citizen male impenetrability) is pervasive in Roman Republican and 
imperial thought from Cicero onwards, finding expression not just in literary, moral 
and philosophical texts, but also in Roman law.<7> Peppered throughout the Epistles, 
we find virtue and reason, virtus and ratio, defined in terms of height, verticality, and 
straightness: the aim is to get to the peak, ad summa (e.g. 71.28). Virtue itself cannot 
elevate itself any further (ultra non potest surgere), just as ‘you’ll find nothing 
straighter, more upright than rectitude’: nil invenies rectius recto (66.8). Virtue – 
which although it has many faces, is always the same divine principle – cannot grow, 
be twisted, or added to – it is perfect. At Ep.66.11, Seneca states – and this is typical 
of many other such statements – that there is only one rule (regula) for human virtue. 
There is a single ratio (reason, reasoning, reckoning) and it is ‘straight’ (recta) and 
‘simple’ or ‘unmixed’ (simplex). This ‘one’ virtue is that which ‘renders the soul 
straight and unwavering’ (quae animum rectum et indeclinabilem praestat, 66.13). 
Compare letter 66.32: ‘virtue is nothing other than straight reasoning’ (virtus non 
aliud quam recta ratio est.). Virtue is ‘high-spirited and exalted’ (animosam et 
excelsam, 71.18): at 71.20, it can be ‘neither shortened nor extended, any more than a 
carpenter’s rule (regula), with which straight lines are tested, can be bent (flectes)’. 
Virtue admits of no bending (et haec recta est, flexuram non recipit.). At Ep.85.32, 
wisdom herself is ‘mistress and ruler’ (domina rectrixque est). Ratio, ever recta, 
keeps the soul from being bowed down (haec enim sola non submittit animum, 92.2). 
The beatus or truly happy man (again in 92.2) keeps to the heights (summa), and leans 
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on no one but himself (ne ulli quidem nisi sibi innixus). Our soul stands erect and 
looks towards the sky (erigitur et spectat in caelum, 92.30) - or at least this is what 
nature intends. 
Seneca’s vision is often explicitly gendered as masculine: the soul is ‘made 
womanish’ (effeminatur, 82.2) by ‘softness’ (mollitia) or ‘luxury’ (luxuria), until it 
matches the ease and laziness with which it lies down (iacet). It is better to avoid, as 
far as possible, the slippery slope of desire (quantum possumus, nos a lubrico 
recedamus, 116.6). The unmoving lying down of indulgent otium not only constitutes 
a slave-like lowering: it is also akin to death. The ultimate model for the horizontal 
subject is, after all, the corpse (or the dehumanized body being tortured on the rack 
<8>), uncovering just what fine upstandingness is poised to ward off (cf. Ep.82.2-3).  
That the discourse of rectitude and verticality pervades Senecan philosophical 
thought as a regulative ideal is in many ways unmissable. Yet – and this is just the 
point made by Erik Gunderson, among other recent critics working in the field of 
Classics - the Epistles are not a Stoic handbook from which we can extract dogma and 
orthodoxy:<9> indeed, this is an extraordinarily unorthodox, unclosed and hospitable 
text, opening itself out laterally to what may seem ‘opposing’ doctrines. What’s more, 
this is a text whose rich literary texture makes it multi-dimensional, meandering, 
hybridic. Much like Cavarero, Seneca pushes, entices us to interact and struggle with 
his literariness in the spirit of full immersion in resilience-building philosophical 
work. In the background of debates surrounding Senecan philosophy as literature is of 
course Plato’s famous definition of the artist in the Laws (847a) as performing a 
dangerous leaning or inclination, in contrast to the philosopher whose inclinations are 
virtuous and ultimately transcendent: part of what both Seneca and Cavarero are 
doing when they write philosophy as literature, and demand that would-be 
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philosophers are also not just readers of literature but literary critics, is responding 
critically and provocatively to that distinction. Neither retreats, as it were, to the 
literary: both, rather, embrace the literary as a means to spur unexpected connections 
and to adopt surprising and even illicit postures. At Ep.59.6-7, Seneca defends his 
notorious ‘literary’ use of metaphors and similes arguing that in philosophy such 
figures serve as necessary ‘props’ (adminicula) to our ‘weakness’ (imbecillitas) and 
help to make key issues vivid. <10> Crucial here is the acceptance of vulnerability 
and the emphasis (much reminiscent of Ruddick’s maternal thinking) on fostering 
growth: <11> we all lean as we learn. It is worth noting also that the term adminicula 
(itself a metaphor) means literally the stakes that train vines to snake upwards, and 
derives from the verb in-mineo (‘to project towards’).  
Such leanings, I would suggest, become paradigmatic of Seneca’s attitude and 
teaching in the Epistles, and constantly lead us away from, postpone, or remake static 
rectitude. Throughout this text, composed at a time in which radical imbecillitas had 
become undeniable, we can glimpse Seneca subtly reconfiguring rectitude as a 
striving for equilibrium that emerges out of oscillation rather than requiring the 
paralysis of movement and that does not continually return the subject to himself. In 
this process, inclination (inclinatio) – which is associated with living consciously in 
time, with erotic desire, friendship, and parental care - is conceived as not necessarily 
in conflict with the telos of rectitude and not at all incompatible with traditional 
Roman Stoic emphasis on compassion, social responsibility, and duty towards others. 
<12> At the same time, Seneca’s uneven and unfinished working out of the 
ontological tension between the ideal Stoic sapiens (constant, unchanging, 
impervious) and the real-life philosopher who must cope with the daily psychological 
and physical challenges of inhabiting a vulnerable, ever-mutating body, demands a 
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radical renegotiation of dignified Roman masculine identity as strictly predicated on 
inviolability and self-sufficiency. <13> What Gretchen Reydams-Shils (2005, 17) 
calls the ‘embedded’ Stoic self will, in Seneca’s hands, raise multiple, culturally 
specific provocations. 
Crucial here is the fact that Seneca chooses to write his longest (and as it turns 
out, most influential) work in the form of epistles, addressed to Lucilius – a younger 
man of equestrian status who was a successful politician but also a writer-poet. By 
adopting the letter form, Seneca inserts himself into a long tradition of philosophical 
letter writing, beginning perhaps with Plato’s letters (although their authenticity 
remains controversial), but extending through Aristotle, pseudo-Pythagorean letters 
from the Hellenistic era, Cynic epistles, and most importantly the corpus of letters by 
Epicurus.<14> The epistolary form also nods towards Socratic dialogue 
(unfortunately the extent of Seneca’s play with and indebtedness to the figure of 
Socrates is beyond the scope of this paper) and there is a didactic point, too, of 
course: letters are engaging, intimate, seductive; they foster a close relationship 
between teacher and pupil. And because the fiction or reality is that they are regular, 
even daily letters, they can offer context-specific therapy that attends to, performs and 
tracks the progress to be made by the proficiens, which itself involves dealing with 
time – that is with mortality, ageing, accidents, change, as well as with Stoic theories 
of time.  
Indeed, (Seneca’s play with) the epistle’s live absent-presence makes patent 
the difficulty of dealing with separation, change over time, as well as with the 
impossibility of stilling time.<15> With Sara Ruddick, and indeed with Cavarero, 
Seneca recognizes that ‘those who change with change and welcome its challenges 
acquire a special kind of learning’,<16> and he promotes this idea by fully inhabiting 
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the implications of giving philosophical guidance in letter form. At Ep.71.1, for 
example, he is aware that the value of advice depends on the specific time it is given. 
The problem is that circumstances volvuntur - they shift and roll onwards - so that 
what is great advice at the moment of writing may have lost its force by the time it is 
read.<17> At Ep.49.1-2, Seneca is overcome with desire to see Lucilius, and reflects 
on how time slips from our grasp even as the letter strives to (di)still it and to conjure 
up memories of the past in the present. The motivations of philosophy in letter form 
are, fundamentally, about dealing with desire and being in time and about 
interrogating the extent to which conventional, aristocratic Roman virility precludes 
this. As it tracks and moves with time, the epistle offers the transcendence of presence 
– or the telos of static rectitude – as a seductive impossibility, and at the same time 
posits the philosopher’s responsibility towards and yearning for his interlocutor as 
extending in the face of the other’s unreachability and distance. The letters are ‘an 
unfolding portrait’, as Ker writes, and it is in their ‘flow’, as Gunderson remarks, that 
we experience ‘the spirit and its vicissitudes’.<18> 
 
III. 
It is therefore within an epistolary frame, which will not permit the disavowal of 
duration, that Seneca regularly qualifies what is meant by an ethics of rectitude.  
Gradually, in this text, virtual postures are tilted and new, often counterintuitive 
spatial perspectives entertained. Already in Ep.20, the positive counterweight to a 
wavering, discordant mind is not rectitude, but tenor (20.3), which means a sustained 
movement or process. In letter 84, Seneca writes, ‘it is a rough road that leads to 
greatness, but if you want to scale this peak, which lies far above the range of 
Fortune, you will indeed look down from above upon all that men regard as most 
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lofty, yet you can proceed to the top over level ground (sed tamen venies ad summa 
per planum 84.13, where planum signifies flat or level ground, but also ‘humble 
position’). The journey towards divine rectitude itself involves leaning into the effort 
of it, and figuratively if not literally tilting off a vertical axis (ad summa nititur, ‘[the 
soul] struggles/leans <19> towards the heights’, 92.30). Indeed the whole emphasis or 
direction of Senecan philosophy is not so much to get us to the end point but to offer 
compassionate guidance as to how to tolerate, virtuously, the journey itself.<20> 
Rather than necessarily embodying the crooked, or being thrown off balance by 
desire, inclinatio is made-over as the movement of nature, which we both emulate and 
flow with in our striving, as carefully charted and performed in the epistles 
themselves. It is no accident that the epistles frame Seneca’s experience of old age, 
which is perceived as a slope, an ‘incline’ (inclinatio) from adolescence onwards to 
old age (ad senectutem, 49.3) which constitutes not the ‘dregs’ of life at the bottom of 
the bottle (Seneca’s metaphor at Ep.58.33) but the ‘highest part of life’ (pars summa 
vitae, Ep.58.33). Indeed, as he writes elsewhere, ‘We all fall into the error of thinking 
that only those who are old and already on the downward path (inclinatosque) are 
tending towards death (ad mortem …vergere), whereas earliest infancy, middle age, 
every period of life in fact, leads in that direction.’ (Consolatio ad Marciam 21.6).  
To an extent, living virtuously in time is apparently a matter of distinguishing 
in a conventional way between good and bad, virtuous and depraved, upstanding 
(masculine) and feminine proclivities. See for example Ep.31.4, where Seneca sings 
the praises of those who don’t indulge in Sisyphean toil, but ‘are leaning towards 
good things’ (ad honesta nitentes). Similarly in 81.15, the good man (vir bonus) has 
good proclivities (in hanc erit partem proclivior). Compare the ethical inverse at 
Ep.94.40, commenting on those who ‘lean towards the deviant’ (inclinabiles in 
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pravum). However Seneca also labors, I would argue, to alter our perception of 
inclinatio as necessarily ‘feminized’, perverse or weak, while at the same time 
figuring virtuous rectitude in terms of courageous movement, flexibility, care, 
affection and responsibility. Look for example at Ep.81. Returning here to the much 
used metaphor of accountancy, Seneca reminds his interlocutor Lucilius that the 
sapiens will act as though he owes something even when he does not: 
 
‘[The good man] will be unwilling to pay a benefit by balancing the injury 
against it. The side he will lean towards (in hanc partem inclinabit), the 
tendency he will exhibit, is that he will desire (cupiat) to owe a favor, and 
desire (cupiat) to return it.’ 
Ep.81.17 
 
At the end of this discussion, which is reminiscent of similar passages in Cicero’s de 
Officiis and Seneca’s own de Beneficiis, Seneca states that when ‘balancing the 
accounts’ of social life, the good man weighs benefits against injuries, but when the 
injury meets the benefit, some kindly feeling (benevolentia) is left over (remanet, 
81.25). This virtual disequilibrium or excess is positively charged, and has to do with 
a generous dis-position towards the other: like Cavarero, and alongside contemporary 
theorists of care ethics, Seneca challenges the ontological presumption that the more 
separate the self is from others, the more developed it is. Just as the spirit of human 
kindness inclines every doubtful case towards the better, Seneca continues (quicquid 
dubium est … inclinat in melius), so the mind of the good man, when another’s merits 
equal his bad deeds, will for sure cease to feel an official obligation (desinet quidem 
debere), but will not stop desiring to feel it (sed non desinit velle debere, 81.26). 
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Indeed, he acts precisely like the man who pays his debts even after they have been 
legally cancelled. In other words, virtue motivates the subject to continue to lean in, to 
desire responsibility for and connection with the heteronomous other to whom he will 
always feel ethically indebted.  
Thus the often-repeated slogan of the ‘straight path’ (rectum iter) in Seneca 
does not describe (or enfolds the paradox of) the posture involved in proceeding, 
diagonally, along it. Letter 123 is indicative. Amid deliberation of how to avoid 
fearing things we are repelled by, and how to avoid desiring, excessively, those things 
that attract us, Seneca urges Lucilius to counteract pre-existing inclinations if he 
wants to take control of his mental life. Yet this is achieved not through replacing 
inclination with static verticality – on the contrary, we need to actively bend in order 
to sustain equilibrium as we rollercoaster through time. Thus: 
 
‘Men coming down a slope bend their bodies backwards (resupinant corpora); 
men ascending a steep place lean forward (incumbent). For, my dear Lucilius, to 
allow yourself to put your body’s weight ahead when coming down, or, when 
climbing up, to throw it backward, is to comply with vice. The pleasures take one 
downhill, but one must work upwards toward that which is rough and hard 
to climb. In the one case let us throw our bodies forward, in the others let 
us put the reins on them (hic impellamus corpora, illic refrenemus).’ 
Ep.123.14 
 
This passage is reminiscent of Nicomachean Ethics 2.9.1109b6-7, where Aristotle 
notes that we must bend sticks in the opposite direction to make them straight. <21> 
But the exigency, in Seneca, is to achieve not straightness, but a degree of balance in 
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forward movement; it is to validate the inclination of the subject in order to make 
virtue compatible with (the acceptance of) being in time that is a condition for human 
flourishing. Bending, then, is not necessarily the posture of one who is a slave to vice, 
in opposition to the sapiens who – at 71.26 for example – stands ‘straight under any 
weight’ (rectus sub quolibet pondere). Neither does it necessarily figure failure, or 
inadequacy: yes, in human beings, the mind tends to curve and sag (incurvari et 
succumbere, 71.26), and on the path towards an ever-distant regulative ideal, the 
philosopher will slide back at times and ‘is habitually turned/twisted/bent on 
slippery terrain’ (versatur in lubrico, 71.28). Yet this is unavoidable, a condition of 
the journey itself and not at all incompatible with being honestus; that which is short 
of perfection must necessarily be unsteady, at one time progressing, at another 
slipping or sinking under (modo sublabantur aut succidant, 71.35). 
Moreover, it is only by reading Seneca’s Latin closely that we can observe 
how, in the climax to this thesis in Ep.71, he begins to reconfigure the bending or 
leaning of philosophical praxis (represented by the verb nitor) as distinct from the 
bodily ‘dislocations’ that figure imperial ‘extravagance’ or ‘luxury’ (luxuria). The 
noun luxus in Latin means both ‘excess’ and ‘dislocation’ (from the Gk. loxós, 
‘oblique’ or ‘slanting’), to which the corresponding verb luxuriare (to be exuberant, 
to swell, to run to excess, with the implication of self-indulgence and disregard for 
moral restraints) is almost certainly etymologically connected. Seneca writes here 
(71.35) that ‘imperfect things/beings’ will slip back (sublabentur) unless they keep 
leaning ahead (nisi ire et niti persaveraverint); for if they ‘go slack’ (laxaverint) in 
determination and faithful application, they will certainly go into reverse (retro 
eundum est). This passage marks an important and productive moment in the Epistles’ 
journey towards re-envisaging inclinatio (distinct from luxuria) as the necessary and 
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courageous posture of the dignified male philosophical subject, particularly (although 
this is never made explicit in Seneca’s text) one who is struggling with the realities of 
extreme vulnerability under the worst years of Neronian tyranny (including the 
prospect of being tortured: torquere, the Latin verb for ‘to torture’ much used by 
Seneca, literally means to twist/distort/bend). 
Yet curving and leaning is not just the condition of the life of the proficiens. 
Significantly, Senecan virtue (virtus) herself ‘inclines’, and even more strikingly, the 
model for this is the mother. In Ep.66, a letter exploring various different aspects of 
virtue which explains the notion that virtue has many forms or vehicles, having 
nothing to do with physical appearance, Seneca gives the example of how parents 
treat their children: we do not judge one unfairly, if the child happens to be sickly 
rather than healthy, just as we love our country not because it is necessarily great, but 
because it is our own (66.22-26) He concludes this section by saying: 
 
And what is the purpose of all this? That you may know that virtue regards all 
her works in the same light, as if they were her children (velut fetus suos) 
showing equal kindness to all, and still deeper kindness to those who encounter 
hardships: for even parents lean with more affection towards those of their 
offspring for whom they feel pity (quoniam quidem etiam parentium amor 
magis in ea, quorum miseretur, inclinat.) 
Ep.66.27 
 
Like Cavarero, whose privileging of inclination now seems to reverberate through 
Seneca’s account, Seneca performs this ‘parental’ posture as he leans towards 
Lucilius, ‘embracing’ him in and through the epistolary relationship. ‘It is one sort of 
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kiss which men give their girlfriend (amicam)’, he states at Ep.75.3, ‘and another 
which they give their children (aliter liberos osculantur). Yet in this latter embrace 
also, holy and restrained as it is, plenty of affection is disclosed (tamen in hoc quoque 
amplexu tam sancto et moderato satis apparet adfectus).’ The noun amplexus 
(‘embrace’), from am(bi)+plecto(r), ‘I weave around’, evokes an enveloping, a coiling 
around or affectionate curvature. Back in letter 13, Seneca explained that the letter as 
sermo or ‘conversation’, one half of a dialogue continually turned and responsive 
towards an other who is moving forward in time, requires a voice, a tongue, which is 
not traditionally Stoic but submissior (Ep.13.4). The phrase submissiore voce is 
usually translated as ‘in a milder or softer voice’, and taken to refer to volume and 
tone. Yet submissus also means lowered, stooped, even submissive and servile.<22> 
In order to give Lucilius genuine, practical instruction about how to deal with real-life 
crises, Seneca will have to steer clear of Stoic grandiosity and pretentiousness, 
speaking in a softer manner, but he will also have to incline himself towards his 
friend, constantly shifting his posture according to the other’s changing needs, 
empathizing with his partner’s troubles and sharing or acting out his own.  
It is worth underlining once more that experiencing and living out the ‘slope’ 
of old age is the on-going backdrop to rethinking not just physical but psychic and 
moral rectitude in the Letters, which track and mimic daily life, the passing of time as 
a pattern of circles - or better waves - that ‘open’ and ‘close’ at the beginning and end 
of each day. <23> Programmatically, in Ep.12, the final letter of the introductory first 
book where Seneca is forced to confront his own decrepitude as mirrored and 
magnified in the crumbling exterior of his country villa, inclinatio as the patriarch’s 
horror of falling into the abyss gives way to an acceptance and delight in gravity. In 
the course of this letter, anxieties about ageing are voiced but also processed, and 
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Seneca reaches a point at which he can advocate ‘let us embrace and love old age’ 
(complectamur illam et amemus, 12.4). ‘Life is most pleasant’ he writes, ‘when it is 
on the downward slope, before rapid decline at the end’ (iucundissima est aetas 
devexa iam, non tamen praeceps, 12.5). But then he adds, ‘Actually, I believe that the 
period which stands so to speak on the edge of the roof (in extrema tegula) possesses 
pleasures of its own.’ (12.5). We might compare Cavarero’s remarks on the joy or ek-
stasis experienced by small children on slides, which she suggests testifies to the (for 
adults, often forgotten) pleasure of abandoning oneself to the laws of gravity, without 
resistance. <24> It is perhaps not surprising then, that Ep.12 also offers a test case for 
documenting the orthopaedics of philology at work in Seneca’s reception by textual 
critics. Although the best manuscripts have tegula at 12.5, meaning tile, and referring 
to the edge of the roof, as if Seneca is on top of the villa about to jump off into 
oblivion, editors have proposed alternatives: Summers prints regula (‘rule’, which 
appears in a few lesser mss., and has been thought by some to refer to the horizon 
line), while Madvig prints specula, meaning ‘summit’. When editors read regula or 
specula over tegula, the banal, shaky roof tile of this tumble-down building, on which 
the philosopher stands as he takes gentle pleasure in anticipation of the fall, is written 
over with the vertical pleasure of reaching the peak, or of standing at the edge of 
straightness itself. 
Indeed, the conventional response to the Letters’ suggestive leanings in the 
direction of ‘feminine’ postures (admitting erotic desire and a ‘dangerous’ degree of 
openness to the other that pushes at the edges of standard Roman amicitia) involves 
inferring a strong mind-body dichotomy that preserves the ideal of virile 
invulnerability at the risk of misrepresenting Senecan thought. Despite the fact that 
according to traditional Stoic doctrine the soul was dispersed through the body 
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(indeed, attending to the body’s health and needs as inseparable from psychic ones is 
an important part of Seneca’s philosophical program in the Letters), this view suggest 
that Seneca is invested in simply unyoking libertas – traditionally defined in Roman 
thought in terms of bodily integrity – from the fate of the actual body. Instead, as 
Shadi Bartsch writes, we should cultivate mental or psychic impenetrability, which 
will become the ‘new sign of masculinity’, using philosophy to build a fortress around 
the soul. In this, Bartsch suggests, Seneca offers an indirect answer to the charge of 
Stoic passivity and appeals cleverly to Roman ideals of military valor. <25> Yet the 
notion that bodily rectitude, the defining feature of the self-referential, in-dependent 
Roman citizen male, is straightforwardly traded in or sacrificed in the Epistles for a 
higher level and sublime psychic walledness radically underestimates both the 
significance of that loss and the process by which Seneca attempts not just to 
‘compensate’ for it, but to understand, accept and rewrite its implications for 
masculine identity. We can trace in the Letters both a reassuring architecture for 
impregnable Roman masculinity and at the same time glimpse this same structure 
being transformed - or bent – into something almost unrecognizable.  
 
IV. 
In order to illustrate this development in greater detail, I want to look finally, at 
Ep.53, before returning to Cavarero. Critics rightly draw attention to passages in 
Seneca – and the crucial ones appear in the Epistles – e.g. 82.5, 74.19 and 49.9– in 
which philosophy is envisaged as an ‘impregnable wall’ (inexpugnabilis murus), 
within which the elite Roman male is still master of his domain. That the 
philosopher’s ‘siege mentality’ is a key image for Seneca is clear. But we must also 
be alert to the ways in which this figure evolves in synch with the dialectical 
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movement of the Epistles themselves and with Seneca’s continued emphasis, within 
the energetic epistolary frame, on accepting vulnerability and on performing 
inclinatio as the basis of a life of virtue. What we encounter, at several points, and in 
place of the static, upright wall, is the sinus - philosophy’s lap, haven, or womb. In 
Ep.103.4, for example, Philosophia herself is a motherly figure offering her womb or 
lap as a haven. Seneca instructs: ‘As much as you are able (quantum potes), seek 
refuge in philosophy. She will protect you in her sinus, and in this holy shrine you 
will be safe or at least, safer (aut tutior).’ Notice the emphasis on degrees of 
commitment and the qualification aut tutior, which marks a subtle stepping away 
from the ideal of absolute security that is coextensive with vertical self-sufficiency. 
Well before 103, Seneca has fleshed out this vision of philosophy-as-mother at Ep.53. 
This letter is concerned with how the body constantly reminds us of our human 
weakness and failings, so that physical symptoms point towards and come to figure 
psychic ones. This is why we must turn to philosophy, Seneca writes. In paragraphs 9-
11, the relationship between student and ‘mistress’ Philosophia is envisaged as a 
mutual, quasi-erotic one, couched in the specular poetics of Roman love elegy. 
Typically, we must engage with the dense literary texture of the letter in order to work 
through what it might teach us. At 53.12, the final sentences of the letter, 
philosophy’s power is revealed: 
 
‘The power of philosophy to blunt the blows of chance is beyond belief. 
No missile can settle in her body (nullum telum in corpore eius sedet); she 
is well protected and impenetrable (munita est, solida). She spoils the 
force of some missiles and wards them off (eludit) with the loose folds of 
her gown (laxo sinu), as if they were flimsy arrows (velut levia tela); 
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others she dashes aside, and hurls them back with such force that they 
recoil upon the sender.’ 
 
Commentators note the ‘virilization’ of Philosophia in this passage, and focus on the 
adjectives munita and solida (well-protected, solid). <26> Yet Philosophia, as she is 
represented here, is no Roman soldier, more a black belt in jujitsu (which means 
literally ‘flexible’ or ‘soft’ art). As much as the female is a mediating instrument and 
metaphor for male discourse in this letter,<27> Seneca also shows here that he will 
not delete female bodiliness from our ideal of male psychic invulnerability, which we 
can perhaps already parse as ‘high level psychic defense mechanisms’, rather than in 
terms of rectitude, as conventionally understood, or of absolute, wall-like security. 
Seneca’s Philosophy never uses a weapon, only the weapons of others, and she is both 
solid and bendy: she defends herself by ‘eluding’, and by leaning this way and that, 
moving her laxus sinus, the ‘roomy’, ‘slack’, ‘relaxed’ ‘fold (of her dress). Sinus 
ostensibly refers here to the loose curves of a gown, but (as in Ep.103.4) also suggests 
a curved recess, the unclosed cavity of a woman’s lap or womb.<28> We might note 
that the image of Philosophia’s protection here is not one of fortress-like containment 
but of embrace (Lucilius is to turn towards her, huc converte, 53.11): the sinus is not 
an enclosure but a swishing fold. Moreover, with the adjective laxus, it seems to 
stand in near contradiction to the adjectives munita and solida. Laxus means loose, 
ample, wide, but also having openings, breached. We might recall the storm at the 
beginning of Virgil’s Aeneid, when the Trojan hulls, their ‘bolts loosened’ 
(laxis…compagibus, Aen.1.122), begin to take on water - a preview of Sinon’s 
‘feminine’ wiles as he opens of the uterus of the Trojan horse in book 2 (laxat 
claustra Sinon, 2.259). In the erotic elegies of Tibullus, the poet-lover warns his girl’s 
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husband not to let her recline at dinner ‘with loose folds of her dress draped over an 
exposed cleavage’ (laxo pectus aperta sinu, 1.6.18), and likewise to send packing any 
dapper suitor ‘whose toga falls slack with copious folds’ (fluit effuso cui toga laxa 
sinu, 1.6.40). Similarly, in Amores 1.8, Ovid has the old procuress Dipsas recommend 
to his puella that she not be too available to her lover but should keep her doors open 
(laxa) to material gifts, while in the Remedia Amoris, the phrase laxo sinu marks the 
attire of the metrosexual urbane lover, where the ‘loose fold’ is itself seductive, the 
sartorial pose to avoid if you want to ditch the torture of eros (680). 
Applied to passive sexual bodies, laxus, and the verb laxare, are also used in 
Latin to imply a ‘looseness’ created by penetration. The Priapea, a collection of 
ninety-five erotic epigrams of unknown provenance from the classical period, include 
a two line poem which runs: ‘It’s a great advantage having such a large penis: no 
woman can ever be too loose (laxa) for me’ (Priapea 18). The last sentence of Ep.53 
is reminiscent, too, of the vicious poetic sparring between Catullus and his friend 
Gellius in Cat.116.7-8: ‘I will evade the missiles (tela) launched against me: / but you 
shall be pierced by mine and pay the price’. Such echoes help generate a striking 
sense of poetic dissonance and ‘thickness’ within the philosophical letter. However, 
unlike Catullus, Philosophia casts back only the weapons used to attack her, and 
transforms them into ‘light weapons’ (levia tela), like so many Cupid’s arrows. Levis 
is a buzzword of Ovidian love elegy in particular (see e.g. Ovid Amores 2.1.21). 
In short, far from moving away from Roman erotic elegy here, Seneca sustains 
and densifies the metaphor. Philosophy’s self-defense is actively, playfully elegizing: 
she makes ‘weapons’, or the elements in life that threaten the proficiens (including, 
presumably, the wrong kind of pleasure or voluptas) seem like Cupid’s arrows. And 
she channels the vulnerable, gender-fluid Ovidian lover, reproducing and inviting the 
 23 
vulnus (‘wound’) of desire even as she ‘dashes it aside’ and remains ‘well-protected’. 
 
V. Conclusions 
This passage in Ep.53 exemplifies how Seneca in the Epistles finds a way to strive for 
invulnerability while acknowledging that this is a state of being that is always yet to 
come. Seneca envisages here a dignified male subject associated, in the lap or folds of 
Philosophia, not with a posture of static straightness but with sinuosity, flexibility and 
the stamina required for continual movement. Philosophia’s sinus mutates elegiac 
otium into a figure for self-defense and philosophical engagement that has nothing to 
do with sloth or passivity. Like the Derridean hymen, this ever-moving dress-as-
shield, both surface and depth, invites and envelops the weapons or forces that 
threaten it even as it spits them back, so that the quasi-erotic ‘embrace’ of the 
proficiens by Philosophy, and vice versa, as well Seneca’s affectionate leaning 
towards and enfoldment of Lucilius in these letters, projects a transformative power to 
alter the nature of every encounter with the other and with fate. <29> The epistolary 
form itself, and more specifically Seneca’s radically hospitable letter (open not just to 
other different philosophical schools but to literary texts of varying genres and to 
oblique, ‘literary’ ways of thinking about and interpreting philosophical ideas) sets 
the stage here for the enfolding of Roman erotic elegy and epigram into a ludic, fertile 
dramatization of Stoic praxis. The scene speaks to what I have suggested in this paper 
is an emerging model of virtuous leaning in the Epistles, a text whose significance in 
the Western philosophical tradition has continually been underestimated in part 
precisely because of negative, orthopedic interpretation of its ‘Roman’ twists and 
turns, its holding and spinning out of paradox or undecidability. Seneca puts ‘doing 
philosophy in Latin’ to work in the precarious conditions of late Neronian Rome so as 
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to radically shift perspectives on what it means for a man to yield, slide, bend and 
desire.  
What we see in Seneca’s Epistles, then, might represent (alongside fellow 
Roman Lucretius, noted by Cavarero, 132-4) another ‘unusual turn’ in the tradition. 
To ‘add’ Seneca to Inclinazioni in no way weakens Cavarero’s argument for the 
overwhelming normativity of the posture of rectitude; nor does it undermine her key 
point that confronting and dealing in ‘stereotypes’ (stereotipi, 25, 61, 167), 
generalities, even simplifications (61) is both politically exigent from a feminist 
perspective and by no means in conflict with philosophical-philological rigor and 
precision. It is rather to take up Cavarero’s own incentive in Inclinazioni to refuse to 
read the canon ‘straight’, and to find oblique and hence revealing points of entry into 
a tradition which, in naturalizing its postures, continues to delegitimize and erase 
others. Cavarero teaches us to be suspicious of Seneca’s near-total absence from the 
canon, and to be alert to the ways in which literary density and playful shape-shifting 
in the Epistles (urge us to) do challenging philosophical work. Likewise, Seneca 
offers us a new frame within which to understand and debate Cavarero’s politically 
charged literariness, together with a stimulus to imagine a ‘new political order’ (182) 
in which a fierce courage and an ethics of care are not mutually exclusive, and in 
which the curving of a mother’s or lover’s body can model rectitude as resilience. 
 
Notes 
1. Trans. A. Minervini and A. Sitze, Stanford University Press. 
2. Cf. De Beauvoir 1949, 15.  
3. Arendt 2003, 81. Cf. Cavarero 2013, 20, 45, 48, 138. 
4. Esp. Gilligan 1982, Ruddick 1989, Kittay 1999, Esposito 2002, Butler 2004, Held 
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2006, Derrida (e.g. 2005, 2007). 
5. MacIntyre 1999. 
6. Veyne 2003, 94 
7. See Walters 1997.  
8. On torture in the Epistles see e.g. 14.3ff., 24.3ff., 44.18ff., 47.3ff., 78.7ff., 
101.10ff.) 
9. Gunderson 2012. 
10. Cf. Quintilian 10.1.125-131 on Seneca’s ‘perverse’ style. 
11. Ruddick 1989. 
12. See esp. Nussbaum 1994, Reydams-Schils 2005. 
13. Cf. Walters 1997. 
14. See Inwood 2007a: xii-xv, and 2007b. 
15. Cf. Edwards 2015, Williams 2015. 
16. Ruddick 1989, 90-91. Berges 2015, 157-61 suggests that Stoic oikeiōsis is 
essentially a model of care that moves outwards from loved ones to world, and 
compares this to Nodding’s expanding ‘circles of care’ (Noddings 2010, 95, 222, 
240-1). 
17. See also Ep.40.1 (the letter brings ‘traces’ of an absent friend), cf. 50.1.  
18. Ker 2009, 149; Gunderson 2015, 88. 
19. Oxford Latin Dictionary (henceforth OLD) nitor. 
20. Cf. Henderson 2006. 
21. Inwood 2007 ad loc. 
22. OLD submissus. 
23. Cf. Ker 2009, 147-76. 
24. Cavarero 2013, 15 
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25. Bartsch 2009, 204. 
26. Berno 2006 ad loc. 
27. Cf. Spivak 1997. 
28. OLD sinus. 
29. Cf. Derrida 1980 and 1981, 197-309. 
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